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Stamatia Devetzi 
Since the 1990s’ a new mode of governance differing from the classical community 
method has been at the centre of political developments at EU level. This new mode of 
governance is called “Open Method of Coordination” (OMC). The OMC has (for-
mally) been introduced by the Lisbon European Council of March 2000. It rests on 
soft law mechanisms such as guidelines and indicators, benchmarking and the sharing 
of best practice. Meanwhile the OMC has been spreading fast to a large range of pol-
icy sectors such as social inclusion, educational policy, pension reform but also issues 
related to the knowledge economy. Before being baptised as “OMC”, this mode of 
governance had already been introduced in the sector of European Employment policy 
– under the name of European Employment Strategy (EES). The EES could therefore 
be considered as the “mother” of the OMC.1 
The following chapter discusses the EES under two aspects. First, it gives an over-
view of its historical development (A). Secondly, it summarizes briefly the current sci-
entific discussion on its merits and problems (B). 
It is not the aim to review all the blossoming academic literature on the EES2 nor 
to analyse in depth the discussion on “soft vs. hard law” or the notions of “govern-
ance” and “Europeanization”. Nevertheless, it is important to discuss some of the sci-
entific findings in order to be able to answer an overarching question linked to the im-
plementation of the EES: Can we consider the EES to have a normative structure and 
has the EES had an impact on national normative structures? In order to discuss these 
questions on the comparative basis of the national reports, it is useful to have an over-
view of the current scientific analysis on the character of the EES itself. 
The EES from a historical perspective 
The developing of the EES under the shadow of the Economic and Monetary 
Union 
The EES should be analysed within the history of European Economic integration, 
which accelerated in the 1990s with the advent of Economic and Monetary Union 
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(EMU).3 Indeed, the completion of the internal market and especially the monetary 
union had considerably reduced the member states’ political margin of manoeuvre. 
For example, in employment, traditional policy tools, such as competitive devalua-
tion, adjustments of national interest rates, public deficit policies, state aid, or wide-
spread hiring in the public sector were mostly invalidated.4 The Delors White Paper 
on Growth, Competitiveness and Employment that was published in 1993 gave birth 
to the very idea of a European employment strategy5 by making explicit reference 
to ensuring that jobs and other social objectives were not ignored. The paper was a 
reflection on the need to revitalise the European project and to counter scepticism 
towards Europe’s monetary integration project.6 The White Paper’s ambition was to 
meet the convergence criteria for the EMU, the implications of which were defla-
tionary, and yet to achieve higher levels of employment in Europe. To meet such a 
challenge, one of the means was to broaden the debate beyond negative flexibility 
to more active labour market policies. The objective was also to integrate employ-
ment policy with other policy issues (fiscal, social protection, environment, equal-
ity of opportunities for men and women, new family patterns, demographic 
changes). 
From the 1993 White Paper a path can be traced to the Essen European Council 
meeting of December 2004. At this meeting the Member States set themselves five 
objectives with respect to employment promotion, making special mention of peo-
ple on the margins of workforce. The five objectives were: a) to invest in voca-
tional training; b) to increase the intensity of employment growth, particularly 
through a more flexible organisation of work and working time and wage restraint; 
c) to reduce non-wage labour costs; d) to develop active labour market policies 
through the reform of employment services, encouraging labour mobility and de-
veloping incentives for the unemployed to return to work; e) to fight youth and 
long-term unemployment. The whole was underpinned by a multilateral monitoring 
procedure. This procedure can be considered as a precursor of the EES. 
The White Paper and the Essen Summit were important catalysts for raising the 
issue of employment on the European Agenda.7 The subsequent European Council 
meetings, notably those of Madrid in December 1995 and Dublin in December 
1996, contributed to the development of the process. The former identified job 
creation as a central objective of the EU. The latter underlined the need to pursue a 
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macroeconomic policy favourable to growth and employment. Based on the Com-
mission’s proposal, the Irish Presidency at the end of 1996 made a first draft of 
what was to become the Employment Title of the Amsterdam Treaty. 
The gestation of the European Employment Strategy was encouraged by the ac-
cession of countries in which explicit or implicit form of social partnership and full 
employment pretensions predominated (Sweden, Finland and Austria) and the ac-
cession to power of center-left governments in existing Member States (France, It-
aly and the UK). Moreover, the director-generalship of Employment and Social Af-
fairs at the Commission had passed to the hands of an official (Allan Larsson) from 
Sweden – a country that had a reputation for utilising “active labour market policy” 
to maintain high levels of employment. Larsson’s argument was that economic, 
monetary and employment policies were to be intricately linked with each other to 
meet mutually supportive goals. 
The EES itself was part of a global deal including the adoption of the Stability 
and Growth Pact. The new French Socialist government, led by Lionel Jospin, 
agreed to the Pact in exchange for adding a new Employment Title to the proposed 
Treaty.8 For most of the Member States and in particular Germany, the Pact was 
intended to be a key instrument for fiscal management after the selection of the 
members of the Eurozone. The Council agreed to the French proposal. At that time, 
little attention was paid to the softer side of economic policy coordination, which 
was set out as a complement to fiscal policy co-ordination. The “soft” coordination 
of economic policies was conceived to monitor the consistency of national eco-
nomic policies with the economic objectives of the EU. In case of a deviation from 
the so-called “Broad Economic Policy Guidelines” (BEPGs), the Council could 
adopt a non-binding recommendation directed to the Member State concerned; 
there is no other formal sanction. A guidelines procedure, based on the idea of shar-
ing of experience and reform experimentation – inspired by the idea of benchmark-
ing often used in industry – allowed working towards common goals at European 
level without encroaching on national sovereignty.9 The sanctions for non-
compliance with the BEPGs take “only” the form of peer pressure and public opin-
ion. 
During the Amsterdam Summit in 1997, agreement was eventually reached in 
the form that the employment strategy should take: the multilateral process associ-
ated with the coordination of economic strategy – the guidelines procedure – would 
be adapted to employment policy. An Employment Title was integrated into the 
Treaty. Although the Treaty was ratified by all Member states only in 1999, the 
Employment Title became already fully operational in 1997: A special “jobs sum-
mit” of EU heads of state and government was organised in Luxembourg in No-
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vember 1997; as a result of this summit, the European Employment Strategy was 
launched.10 
The creation of such guidelines procedure was (thus) a compromise between 
two positions: on the one hand, the conviction that European Intervention based on 
the Community method and a real common European employment policy would be 
too intrusive into the member states’ competencies; and on the other hand, the 
awareness that high and rising unemployment represented a major social and eco-
nomic challenge for Europe.11 
The Employment Title in the revised Treaty stipulated that employment was a 
matter of “common concern” to the member states. It laid the basis for an EU role 
in coordinating member states labour market policies – with the BEPGs-procedure 
being a “role model”, as mentioned above. This method subsequently received the 
title “open method of coordination” at the Lisbon summit in 2000. 
The EES Process as designed by the Amsterdam Treaty is the following: Each 
year, following the Commission`s proposal, the Council adopts common European 
Employment Guidelines by a qualified majority vote. Afterwards they have to be 
translated into national employment policies on which each Member State reports 
to the Commission and the Council in their yearly “National Action Plans” (NAPs). 
These are analysed by the Commission, who makes recommendations to the Mem-
ber states. Since 2000 the national recommendations have been integrated in a so-
called “employment package”, along with proposals for new guidelines for the fol-
lowing year. The Employment Guidelines (EGs) are then endorsed by the European 
Council and formally adopted by the Council (of labour ministers). Thus the cycle 
recommences. 
Though the recommendations to individual states, which are deemed not to 
have followed the guidelines, have no binding effect, they could however be politi-
cally powerful. 
The EES from 1997 to 2002 
Between the Luxembourg summit of 1997 and 2002, the annual Employment 
Guidelines were organised under four pillars: 
a) improving employability: aimed at improving the access of the unem-
ployed to the labour market, it focused on the development of a “preventive 
approach” to avoid long-term unemployment as well as on the implementa-
tion of “activation policies”; 
b) developing entrepreneurship: making it easier to start and run a new 
business and to hire people in it by reducing administrative constraints and 
rendering taxation more employment-friendly; 
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c) encouraging adaptability both for employees and businesses: this en-
tailed modernisation of work organisation; 
d) strengthening equal opportunity policies; this involved a gender main-
streaming approach for all four pillars, reducing the gender gap, reconciling 
work and family life, and facilitating re-integration into the labour market. 
About 20 EU guidelines were formulated each year by the Commission under the 
four pillars described above. In practice, the changes made to the Employment 
Guidelines until 2003 were fairly minor. In 2001, six “horizontal objectives” (i.e. 
cross-cutting the four pillars) were added:12 increase the employment rate; improve 
the quality of employment; define a global strategy for life-long learning; involve 
the social partners in all stages of the process; develop relevant social indicators; 
find a balanced approach to the four pillars. Especially the first “horizontal objec-
tive”, to increase the employment rate (rather than simply cutting registered unem-
ployment), became the centre and the main goal of the EES. 
Along with the guidelines, the EES also includes a series of indicators.13 The 
so-called “key indicators” measure progress in relation to the objectives of the 
guidelines. For example, there are indicators that measure the total employment 
rate, the employment rate for people aged 55-64, the share of young adults still un-
employed after six months, the tax rate on low-wage earners, and several dimen-
sions of the gender gap in employment. The resulting tables are made available an-
nually and show the relative position of all Member states on these dimensions. 
In the frame of the EES-development, the Lisbon European Council of 2000 can be 
considered as its climax. The EU launched the “Lisbon process” and a new strategic 
goal – “to become the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy in the 
world capable of sustainable economic growth with more and better jobs and greater so-
cial cohesion”.14 This process gave the EES a new impetus by creating a ten-year plan 
to reach. Quantified objectives with target dates were agreed for the Union as a whole – 
to increase the European employment rate to 70% by 2010, the female employment rate 
to 60% and the employment rate among older workers (55-64) to 50%. 
The EES from 2002 until today 
Ten years after the Maastricht Treaty and five years after the beginning of the Employ-
ment Strategy much had changed in the European process. Despite the fact that the 
1999-2000 transition to the single currency was a success, the central question at the be-
ginning of the 1990s, regarding which economic and social model in the context of a 
centralised monetary regime is the best, remained unanswered.15 The objectives of the 
Stability and Growth Pact (especially the one not to exceed the ceiling of 3% for the 
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budget deficit) initially were considered to be consensual and accepted by all key actors 
– i.e. the central bankers and the Ministers of Economics and Finance. But after the de-
bate about whether or not to send an early warning to Germany and Portugal (whose 
public deficits were approaching the 3% deficit ceiling), the Pact itself became a much 
more disputed theme, leading the former President of the Commission Romano Prodi to 
call it “stupid”. Recently, proposals from the Commission were put under discussion at 
the Ecofin Council to modify the Stability and Growth Pact and make it more flexible. 
If the Stability and Growth Pact is under revision, the softer side of economic coor-
dination – the BEPGs – has proved to be inefficient in its principal goal of coordinating 
economic (and social) reforms. The real effectiveness of the economic policy coordina-
tion tools has been questioned; a study carried out for the European Parliament showed 
a lack of awareness of the BEPGs nationally and therefore a lack of integration into na-
tional policy processes.16 The (non) compliance by the Member States with the BEPGs 
recommendations seemed to be similar to their response to the European employment 
guidelines. 
In the first half of 2002 Commission and Member States jointly carried out a com-
prehensive evaluation of the EES’ merits and shortcomings. Initially, the evaluation 
process was rather secretive. The national researches regarding the advantages and the 
limits of the method followed no common methodology. On the other hand, it was the 
first time that the Member states evaluated their employment policies at the same time. 
Under the pressure of the Commission’s discourse on openness, all Member states de-
cided to publish the results of the national evaluations on the web. The Commission’s 
synthesis of the results of the evaluation and the policy conclusions it drew from this ex-
ercise were published in two Commission Communications.17 In the first Communica-
tion, the EES was judged a success in terms of both labour market outcomes (reference 
is made to 10 million jobs being created in Europe between 1997 and 2002) and policy-
making: “there have been significant changes in national employment policies with a 
clear convergence towards the common EU objectives set out in the EES policy guide-
lines”. Challenges remained, however, in demographic trends, regional differences, re-
structuring, globalisation and enlargement. In addition, it was noted, though fleetingly, 
that EU unemployment and the number of long-term unemployed remained high.18 
The policy conclusions drawn by the Commission in its second Communication 
were that the EES needed to be focused more clearly on implementation rather than 
procedure. Steps had to be taken to raise awareness of the EES and to improve its visi-
bility and impact. Also, coherence between the various policy processes, and especially 
the BEPGs, needed to be improved. During the Barcelona Council in March 2002 it had 
been decided that the BEPGs and the EEGs should be synchronised in terms of yearly 
                                           
16 TEPSA, The Broad Economic Policy Guidelines, Final Report, Project Nr. IV/2001/05/01 for the European 
Parliament, Directorate General for Research, 24 January 2002. 
17 European Commission, Taking Stock of Five Years of the European Employment Strategy, COM (2002) 416 
final, 17.7.2002; European Commission, On Streamlining the Annual Economic and Employment Policy Coordi-
nation Cycles, COM (2002) 487 final, 3.9.2002. 
18 Watt, Reform of the EES after five years: A change of course or merely of presentation?, European Journal of 
industrial relations 2004, pp.117-137, p. 125. 




scheduling, rather than having the EES take place in the autumn and the BEPGs in the 
spring. Following this decision the Communication designed a new policy cycle which 
would be built on two blocks: a) the “Guidelines Package” (every April), composed of 
the BEPGs, the Employment Guidelines and the employment recommendations and b) 
the “implementation package” (every January), which included the BEPGs implementa-
tion report, the draft Joint Employment Report and the implementation report on the In-
ternal Market Strategy. This was called the “streamlined Policy Coordination Cycle”. 
An important change was that both BEPGs and EES focus on implementation in a 
longer cycle of three years.19 
Following the 2002 evaluation, the Commission adopted a Communication on the 
future of the EES in January 2003.20 The four-pillar structure (employability, adaptabil-
ity, entrepreneurship and gender equality) which had underpinned the guidelines since 
1997 was replaced by three overarching objectives: 
- full employment 
- quality and productivity at work 
- social cohesion and an inclusive labour market. 
From that point on, all of the Employment Guidelines in the following years were – 
more or less – based on these three objectives. 
Yet, in 2003, a lot of the employment targets the EU had set in the previous 
years turned out to be unmet. For that reason – and also in order to identify specific 
measures geared to helping the Member States implement the revised EES – a 
Taskforce was established in March 2003. The Taskforce was headed by ex Prime 
Minister Wim Kok of the Netherlands. The first report was issued in November 
2003 and had the title “Jobs, jobs, jobs: creating more employment in Europe”. The 
main ingredients of the Taskforce’s recipe were the following: a) increasing 
adaptability of workers and enterprises; b) attracting more people to the labour mar-
ket; c) investing more and more effectively in human capital; and d) ensuring effec-
tive implementations of reforms through better governance. The notions of adaptabil-
ity and flexibility are stressed in the report; particular attention is drawn to the “best 
practices” in Denmark and the Netherlands for creating a balance between flexibility 
and security. The report also stresses the importance of lifelong learning and of “ac-
tive ageing”. 
The Commission welcomed this report and used most of its messages for clearer 
Recommendations in the year 2004.21 In this year, the Member States presented their 
first triennial NAPs and the streamlining process was tested. Also in 2004, another 
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important change took place: The ten new Member States of the EU prepared their 
first NAPs for employment along with the 15 other Member States. 
After the first report, the Taskforce was asked to present a second report on the 
Lisbon strategy as a whole. It was published in November 2004 under the title “Fac-
ing the challenge”. It should not be swept under the carpet that the reason to establish 
the task force in the first place was the underperformance of national policies in re-
spect to the Lisbon targets. Concerning policy priorities, the report highlights im-
proved economic growth, increased employment and productivity. Other priorities, 
which concern especially the labour market, include (again) strategies for investment 
in human capital formation, lifelong learning, active ageing as well as improving the 
adaptability of workers and enterprises. 
Inspired by the second Taskforce report, in February 2005 the Commission made a 
proposal for a revamp of the Lisbon strategy. This proposal was based on a very critical 
evaluation of the first five years.22 It was stated that without further action, the 2010 tar-
get of a 70% overall employment rate would not be achieved. Labour productivity 
growth has continued to slow down and quality of work and inclusive labour markets 
remain important challenges in many Member States. The Commission observes very 
critically that the poor progress made was “not just a question of difficult economic 
conditions since Lisbon was launched, it also results from a policy agenda which has 
become overloaded, failing co-ordination and sometimes conflicting priorities”. From 
now on, focus should be put on delivering stronger, lasting growth and more and better 
jobs. 
The Lisbon strategy revamp has led to a complete revision of the EES.23 Its guide-
lines will from now on be presented in conjunction with the macroeconomic and micro-
economic guidelines and for a period of three years.24 This new EES covers a three year 
period, from 2005 to 2008. In this frame, the former NAPs are now called “National Re-
form Programmes” (NRPs). 
The Employment Guidelines – as part of the integrated package of EGs and 
BEPGs – are as follows (for the period 2005-2008):25 
- Guideline No 17: Implement employment policies aimed at achieving full 
employment, improving quality and productivity at work and strengthening so-
cial and territorial cohesion, 
- Guideline No 18: Promote a lifecycle approach to work, 
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- Guideline No 19: Ensure inclusive labour markets, enhance work attractive-
ness, and make work pay for job-seekers, including disadvantaged people, and 
the inactive, 
- Guideline No 20: Improve matching of labour market needs, 
- Guideline No 21: Promote flexibility combined with employment security and 
reduce labour market segmentation,  
- Guideline No 22: Ensure employment-friendly labour costs developments and 
wage-setting mechanisms, 
- Guideline No 23: Expand and improve investment in human capital, 
- Guideline No 24: Adapt education and training systems in response to new 
competence requirements. 
Some authors see the new phase after 2005 as the beginning of “realistic co-
operation” between Member States and the EU.26 As the limits of the EES had be-
come obvious (the implementation, especially of the employment goals, was far 
behind the targets), the Commission now seems to accept the “national ownership” 
of the OMC process. This implies that the performances of the Member States will 
not be ranked even if the Taskforce had demanded such a ranking as a prerequisite 
for “naming, shaming and faming”. 
Throughout the next cycle of the Employment Guidelines (2008-2010) the EES 
will focus especially on “flexicurity”, which strikes a balance between flexibility 
and security on the labour market.27 Member States will be invited to use their Na-
tional Reform Programmes to report explicitly on their flexicurity strategies and the 
Commission will report on the progress made at the end of the Lisbon Cycle.28 
The discussion on the EES 
The scientific discussion on the EES is part of the overall discussion on the OMC 
as a new mode of governance in the European Union.29 Literature on the OMC in 
general – and the EES in specific –wavers between excessive enthusiasm and 
doubts.30 There are many different aspects that have been discussed, like issues of 
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democracy in general (in the sense of participation, transparency and openness)31, 
the participation of the social partners in the EES32 or the OMC as a new form of 
governance.33 For the purposes of our comparative project, it should be useful to 
focus on the discussion on the aspects of “soft versus hard law” and on the impact 
the EES might have on the Member States’ policies: if we want to find out more 
about the normative character of the EES, then we should ask under what premises 
it can influence national normative structures. 
The discussion on “soft” and “hard” law 
Much of the controversy on the EES/OMC concerns the respective merits of “hard” 
and “soft” law in the construction of Social Europe.34 A shift from “integration by 
law” to “Europeanization by figures” via benchmarking seems to have taken 
place.35 Both those who favour the OMC as a mode of governance and those who 
question its desirability compare the OMC, implicitly or explicitly, with the Com-
munity Method. The Community Method is thought of as “hard law” because it 
creates uniform rules that Member States must adopt, provides sanctions if they fail 
to do so, and allows challenges for non-compliance to be brought in court. In con-
trast, the OMC, which has general and open-ended guidelines rather than rules, 
provides no formal sanctions for Member States that do not follow the guidelines, 
and is thought of as “soft law”. Proponents of the OMC argue that it can be effec-
tive despite – or rather because of – its open-ended, non-binding, non-justiciable 
qualities. Opponents question that conclusion. They not only argue that the OMC 
cannot do what is needed to construct Social Europe but also that “hard law” is es-
sential. They also fear that the OMC might become the dominant method of regula-
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tion on issues which are subject to little or no EU competence and, more seriously, 
on issues which are subject to hard law, thus demoting the Community Method.36 
Some authors37 point out that – in drawing the dichotomy between hard law and 
soft law – it is often forgotten that the EC has used a combination of these meas-
ures, not only in social law, but also in areas such as environmental law. They ar-
gue that hard and soft law should not necessarily exclude each other. Instead they 
underline the possible utility of hybrid solutions.38 Some others argue that, if in its 
ideal-typical format the OMC can deliver “better governance”, then it is not a sec-
ond-best option to hard legislation: it is a better way forward, because it fosters 
learning and provides flexibility to the policy process.39 
Regardless of what advantages or disadvantages soft law might have, a unanim-
ity on the character of the OMC (and the EES as a prominent example of it) as “soft 
law” surely exists. Consequently – and beyond the theoretical discussion on what is 
better for the European Integration – the next step is to ask what kind of impact soft 
law might really have in practice on the Member States’ policies and legislation. 
The discussion on the impact of EES on Member States’ policies 
Did the EES influence the employment policies of the Member States? And if yes 
to what extent? This is an important question in the current scientific debate on the 
EES. The key-words are the “European Social Model” and “policy learning”. 
A good deal of policy-makers and academics look at the OMC (and the EES as 
part of it ) as an instrument to build “Social Europe”. From a reform perspective, 
the EES can be seen as an additional instrument with which to enhance the social 
dimension to the European Union. Others, however, remain sceptical of its real 
added value to compensate the European Social Model for the liberal bias of EU 
integration.40 Again others question how one can speak of one “European social 
model” when evidence from employment policy points to a conflict upon models, 
to such an extend that the real politics of the EES is all about finding out which 
models are under pressure. This question becomes even more complex if one takes 
research into account which demonstrates that: (a) The EU “social model” is more 
a discourse sponsored by some political elites in some countries than reality; and 
(b) EU social policy has been so far more “American” in style than “European”, in 
the sense that the US style approaches (by way of the British government) have 
greatly influenced the social and employment policy (keywords: workfare and la-
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bour market flexibility).41 Also it has been argued that the EES is characterised by 
Third Way type ideas, including equity and activation.42 The guidelines on em-
ployment reflect the political options of New Labour;43 as such they are not neces-
sarily adapted to the macro-economic reality of other countries. Other authors dif-
ferentiate more. They conclude that the employment policy model behind the EES 
is a compromise between the liberal and the Nordic models: on the labour demand 
side the EES, with its attention for entrepreneurship and adaptability, is inspired by 
the liberal model emphasising labour market deregulation and tax reductions; 
whereas on the labour supply side the EES is inspired by the Nordic model focus-
ing on employability via training and active labour market policies.44 In any case, it 
can be affirmed that most of the pressure to converge towards the EU’s objectives 
under the EES – of which activation is an important component – is on countries 
with Continental and Southern European welfare state arrangements, with domi-
nance of “passive” policies.45 
When it comes to the notions of “policy learning” and “policy transfer”, almost 
all authors agree that an assessment is difficult to make. One reason is that, when 
measuring the national impact of the EES, it is not easy to disentangle the effects of 
EU structural reforms from national structural reforms which would have been car-
ried out anyway. Also, it is not easy to evaluate the respective merits of structural 
reforms and the macroeconomic situation when trying to explain, for example, the 
improving or worsening employment results.46 Some authors state that “there is (..) 
some evidence that (…) OMC processes have contributed to specific changes in in-
dividual Member States’ policies. Such evidence is most abundant for the EES”.47 
But on the other hand, they agree that “the possibilities for mutual learning on be-
half of the Member States seem to be rather limited; there are relative few examples 
of direct policy learning and cross-national policy transfer”.48 Critics of the “change 
has happened because of the EES”-position claim that “we only know that some 
change took place but there is no empirical data which proves that the change really 
happened as a result of the EES”.49 
It has also been stated that the OMC process has transformed from a discursive 
operation to learn from each others’ best practices and to implement change, to a 
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sort of “beauty contest” showing one’s successes but omitting one’s failures.50 Ex-
aminations of the peer review procedure – as one component of the EES – show 
that, whilst a learning process has been established, its impact has been limited. Al-
though the EES has established labour market targets, the evidence reveals that 
Member States will rely on home-grown means – administrative, institutional and 
legal – to meet them. The peer review procedure was, at best, a learning process for 
a limited community of labour market technicians and experts. There were no sig-
nificant efforts at emulation.51 
Empirical evidence for a subtle, but nevertheless quite effective influence of the 
EES on the employment strategies of Germany52 and France has also been pre-
sented. Yet learning does not mean a transfer of concepts. In the German case 
learning consisted more of a mutual “irritation” of European and national patterns 
of perception and behaviour; and the French case is characterised by a mostly sym-
bolic conformity to the European objectives..53 
Other researchers argue that the EES has been acting as a framer of employ-
ment policy in the Member States.54 By doing so, the supranational level has re-
strained several dimensions of employment policy and labour market policies in the 
Member States mainly by: (a) defining and (reinforcing) what problems domestic 
policy-makers should attack to increase member state competitiveness; (b) pointing 
out and/or reinforcing the idea that a policy line is good or bad; (c) restricting and 
limiting the policy options and courses of action that domestic policy-makers 
should develop and (d) providing courses of action that allow policy makers to 
“learn” about ways to solve the problem in question. Under the influence of the 
EES, member states have been experiencing a “Europeanisation of labour market 
problems and solutions”.55 
The impact of the EES from a comparative law perspective: an outlook 
Almost all of the above cited literature on the impact or influence of the EES/OMC 
on the Member States belongs to the field of political science or social policy. In 
fact, the concept of policy transfer or policy learning is well established in the po-
litical science literature. Lawyers have been slow to argue that the OMC is capable 
of offering a normative dimension to European integration processes or even to na-
tional structures. It has been seen as a pre-legal process or an alternative or as a 
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complementary political process.56 Yet the role of the EES should not be underes-
timated: the framing of a policy through Guidelines, Indicators and Benchmarking 
is (as discussed) not a soft or neutral process, but rather it shapes – and restricts – 
the framework within which national actors work. As a prominent Belgian politi-
cian put it: “The open method of coordination” is both a cognitive and a normative 
tool. (…) It is a normative tool because, necessarily, common objectives embody 
substantive views on social justice”.57 Member States are no longer free to deter-
mine national policy but must act within officially recognised Community Guide-
lines which have taken a normative status..58 
In a comparative welfare law approach, it will be certainly interesting to see to 
what extend the EES really has had an impact on national normative structures; or, 
in other words, to see to what extend “soft” law at the European level might prove 
to be “harder” at the national level. For that purpose, the comparative analysis of a 
specified aspect of the EES – such as the activation policies – certainly promises to 
be fruitful. Instead of asking in general what impact the EES might have on na-
tional employment policies or on reducing unemployment, it seems more rewarding 
to single out concrete laws, legal practices and questions in the Member States and 
compare them with each other. Even if we should come to the conclusion that the 
normative impact of the EES is not that significant in practice, the comparison itself 
may lead us to more “learning from each other”. It is exactly this goal that has been 
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